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While I do not wish to corrment on the 
rornpliments that Lilly-Marlene Russow pays my 
book, I must admit that her criticisms are 
both fair and accurate. For example, despite 
my best efforts, there is still unnecessary 
jargon. Also, I did not pay sufficient at-
tention to the philosophical aspects of the 
issue and doubt that I could have produced an 
adequate analysis, anyway. I did not try to 
draw the topics together by analyzing the 
similarities and differences between, say, 
psychological research and toxicological 
testing. Finally, the book grew out of the 
problems I had encountered and had tried to 
resolve through six years as a critical ob-
server of animal research. As a result, the 
chapters reflect the issues that I have dealt 
with, and this explains most of the organiza-
tional problems that a reader might encoun-
ter. 
Russow comments on a reference to "ap-
parent philosophical sophistry" and notes 
that this tends to stereotype the theoretical 
aspects of the issue in a rather negative 
light and then further suggests that the book 
would have been improved with a better theo-
retical analysis of such concepts as "suffer-
ing" and "consciousness." I agree. I apolo-
gize for the cheap shot at philosophers, 
although I would argue that the adjective 
"apparent" should save me from being branded 
as another philistine! However, it is diffi-
cult for those of us who were trained in the 
empirical sciences to take philosophical 
theory as seriously as we should. one of the 
comonest corrments I hear from my scientific 
colleagues is that moral philosophy is ulti-
mately a matter of personal preference. It 
is often impossible to get beyond this notion 
no matter how much one tries to insist on 
theoretical coherence and internal consisten-
cy. 
DISCUSSION 
Russow raises an excellent point with 
her corrments about suffering and conscious-
ness. As I was writingOf Mice, Models and 
Men, I became aware of the lack of good 
arguments about the nature of animal suffer-
ing. In fact, the literature on human suf-
fering is very thin, as well. As a result, I 
have been spending the past few years snatch-
ing what time I could to investigate the 
mental complexity of animals and humans and 
to explore the nature of suffering. 
The biological literature is full of 
fascinating data. For example, any notion of 
pain and suffering has to contend with the 
fact that one can have pain without suffer-
ing. Patients with pre-frontal lobotomies, 
for example, have the same pain-detection 
thresholds as no.rmal people, but the pain 
does not seem to "bother"them as much (if at 
all) • When asked about this, these indivi-
duals say that they feel the pain (and they 
will jt.nnp if pricked unexpectedly with a pin) 
but the"agony" is no longer there. Interest-
ingly, people with lobotanies also do not 
appear to have verbally-mediated anxieties--
that is, anxieties associated with particular 
words. Perhaps language possession is, after 
all, a morally relevant characteristic. 
Consciousness raises a whole host of 
other questions and is, to biology, as quan-
tum theory is to physics. When investigating 
these phenomena, it becomes more and more 
difficult to distinguish between empirical 
data and metaphysical theories. Any analysis 
that claims to be thorough must deal with 
both empirical science and philosophical 
theory. Griffin I s books on anirral conscious-
ness are an interesting example of this. 
Griffin provides us with a wealth of data and 
with some theory, but, although he will ac-
knowledge when challenged that his arguments 
raise considerable moral questions, he does 
not address these questions at all in his 
books. 
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I have been particularly intrigued with (continued from p. 2) 
the notion of deception. Many species at-
tempt to deceive competitors and predators. 
In nost cases, such deception is not inten-
tional, but it can be very difficult indeed 
to decide what is and is not intentional 
deception. Chimpanzees appear to deceive 
others intentionally. There are also obser-
vations indicating that baboons may indulge 
in intentional deception. But what of the 
broken-wing display of the plover when it 
tries to lure potential predators away from 
its nest? My interest in this issue stems 
from the fact, that it seems that intentional 
deception involves a series of thoughts that 
indicate that you are thinking that I am 
thinking that you intend some specific ac-
tion. This circular reasoning appears to 
indicate that you are self-conscious; that 
is, you are capable of being the object of 
your own thoughts. Intentional deception can 
be studied empirically and distinguished 
(albeit with difficulty) from non-intentional 
deception. Of course, one then still has to 
indicate what moral relevance, if any, such a 
distinction has, but it seems to me that 
mental complexity (or mental capacity) is 
very imp::)rtant in developing a coherent theo-
ry of the noral status of different animals. 
In conclusion, I hope to produce, in the 
not too distant future, something a little 
rrore concrete and satisfying on the nature of 
animal suffering and consciousness and its 
noral implications. One does not need a 
sophisticated noral theory to criticize some 
uses of research anirnals--such as in LD50 
testing or in research that causes easily 
avoidable suffering or death. However, there 
are a lot of research projects that do not 
fall into such categories, and we are just 
beginning to search for a rrorally satisfacto-
ry and consistent public consensus on when 
animal research can be justified. Of Hice, 
Hodels and Hen was intended to help define 
what some of the questions might be. It was 





Parental affecti.0n solely in an almost sacred 
light. 
I do indeed grant that partial affec-
tions (not just parental) for those close to 
us are brute facts that must be dealt with 
whenever rroral duties are under discussion. 
I suspect that on a hypothetical sinking 
ship, my partial affection would lead me to 
prefer saving my dog, that I personally know 
and love, to saving a human stranger. Why 
are the partial affections of a person for a 
non-human animal automatically dismissed by 
Nelson as obviously less "rrorally worthy" 
than those of a parent for his/her child? (I 
am speaking here of Professor Aiken's chimp.) 
Indeed, the love of a person for a pet animal 
may closely resemble parental love, without, 
however, the ego-supporting "chip off the old 
block" element. 
Toward the end of the xenograft article, 
Nelson mentions !:lis opinion that there is a 
rrorally relevant distinction between animals 
and "marginal" humans, in that "marginal" 
humans have suffered a so-called tragedy in 
"becoming the psychological equals of ani-
mals." A defective human is certainly not, 
as Nelson puts it, the psychological equal of 
a normal, healthy animal--this is a blatantly 
anthropocentric statement. Birth defects are 
a natural occurrence--a deformed or internal-
ly defective puppy is rejected by its rrother 
and dies. This may be sad" but it is no 
tragedy. A human infant may be born with 
many mental and physical defects--why is this 
seen as a tragedy? If the appeal to the 
"tragedy" of so-called "marginal" humans 
automatically places such humans off limits 
for medical exploitation, why is not birth ~ 
an animal in this world considered equally 
tragic? Certainly being granted no rroral 
value whatsoever ought to be tragic enough to 
warrant exemption from torture. 
---~-- Donna Richards 
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